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THE ONE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE-A FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE OF APPELLATE PRACTICE
IN CALIFORNIA
By EDMOND W. BURKE, *
THE initial step in preparing an appeal should be a careful examina-
tion of the case to determine whether the particular order or judgment
is appealable.1 A great number of appeals are dismissed for failure to
observe this elementary principle.2
Many a sturdy ship has gone to the bottom as a result of an un-
expected encounter with an iceberg. The "sea" of appellate practice is
filled with its own particular brand of "icebergs," through which the
attorney must navigate a safe course for his client. One of the most
formidable of these obstacles is the so-called "one final judgment rule."
Often the rule and its application is a picture of marvelous simpli-
city. However, in the words of one writer, "in complicated cases the
one final judgment rule proves to be a delusion, and appeals from sep-
arate final judgments in a single action continue to present the most
difficult problems in the field of appellate procedure."3
Underlying Principles
Before examining the rule itself, some consideration must be given
to a few of the basic principles governing appeals in this state.
The California Constitution makes no provision concerning the
procedure to be followed where an appeal is contemplated.4 Appellate
procedure is entirely statutory and subject to complete control by the
legislature.' Statutes have been enacted designating those judgments
* Member, Second Year Class.
' Swain, Procedural Pitfalls, 33 CAL. S. BAR J. 144 (1958).
Ibid.
8 3 WrriiN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Appeal § 10 at 2152 (1954).
'3 CAL. JuR. 2d Appeal and Error § 4 (1952).
Trede v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 2d 630, 134 P.2d 745 (1943) ; City of Los Angeles v.
Schweitzer, 200 Cal. App. 2d 448, 19 Cal Rptr. 429 (1962) ; Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 185 Cal.
App. 2d 149, 8 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1960); see generally 3 WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE
Appeal § 1 (1954). Note also that care should be taken to avoid confusion where the cases
have used the term right instead of procedure. See 3 CAL. JuR. 2d Appeal and Error § 4
(1952).
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and orders from which an appeal will lie.6 It is the general rule that
direct appeals will be permitted only from those orders and judg-
ments which are made appealable by statute.'
The question of appealability is of vital importance. If the order
or judgment appealed from is not within the provisions of one of the
statutes an appellate court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.'
Moreover, if a reviewing court determines that the purported appeal is
from a nonappealable order, and the court is therefore without the
necessary jurisdiction, it has no recourse other than to dismiss the
appeal on its own motion,' even though the parties are silent upon the
issue of appealability.
'E.g., CAL. CODE CrV. PROC. §§ 963, 974-75, 983; CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1237-38, 1466;
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1240, 1630.
'Lavine v. Jessup, 48 Cal. 2d 611, 311 P.2d 8 (1957) ; Collins v. Corse, 8 Cal. 2d 123,
64 P.2d 137 (1936) ; Sherman v. Standard Mines Co., 166 Cal. 524, 137 Pac. 249 (1913) ; City
of Los Angeles v. Schweitzer, 200 Cal. App. 2d 448, 19 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1962) ; Peninsula
Properties Co. v. Santa Cruz, 106 Cal. App. 2d 669, 235 P.2d 635 (1951) ; see generally 3
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDuRE Appeal § 9 (1954). But cf. Meehan v. Hopps, 45 Cal. 2d 213,
288 P.2d 267 (1955), critically analyzed in 3 WIKniN, supra, § 11 (A) (Supp. 1961). However,
these statutes are concerned only with appellate procedure. "[T]he specification of the judg-
ments and orders which may be appealed from as such and separately in effect merely pro-
vides a procedure, and in no way limits the scope of appellate review. The language of the
statutes is sufficiently broad to provide a review on appeal of practically every judgment,
order, ruling, or matter affecting the substantial rights of the parties. For example, while
interlocutory orders may not ordinarily be appealed from, they may be reviewed on appeal
from the [final] judgment . .. ." [Emphasis added.] 3 CAL. Ju. 2d, Appeal and Error §
35 at 445 (1952). In addition, it is important hereafter to observe the technical distinctions
between the terms "appealability" and "reviewability." "The 'appealability' of a decision, as
that term is used in this article, means its ripeness for consideration by an appellate
court, that is, whether it is procedurally apt for appeal, as distinguished from 'reviewability,'
which is used as meaning whether, because of its substantive nature, the question is one fit
for the appellate court to consider. While the distinction noted has been pointed out by the
courts on occasion, it is frequently ignored and the terms 'appealable' and 'reviewable' used
interchangeably." 4 Ass. Jun. 2d Appeal and Error § 47 at 570 (1962).
'Rossi v. Caire, 189 Cal. 507, 209 1=ac. 374 (1922) ; Sherman v. Standard Mines Co.,
166 Cal. 524, 137 Pac. 249 (1913) ; City of Los Angeles v. Schweitzer, 200 Cal. App. 2d 448,
19 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1962) ; Futlick v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 296, 308 P.2d
405 (1957).
' Collins v. Corse, 8 Cal. 2d 123, 64 P.2d 137 (1936) ; City of Los Angeles v. Schweitzer,
200 Cal. App. 2d 448, 19 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1962) ; Olmstead v. West, 177 Cal. App. 2d 652, 2
Cal. Rptr. 443 (1960) ; Rosenberg v. Knesboro, 80 Cal. App. 2d 36, 180 P.2d 750 (1947) ;
Bessinger v. Grotz, 52 Cal. App. 2d 379, 126 P.2d 355 (1942). Similarly, jurisdiction cannot
be conferred by the consent or stipulation of the parties, estoppel or waiver. See Phillips v.
Phillips, 41 Cal. 2d 869, 264 P.2d 926 (1953) ; Estate of Hanley, 23 Cal. 2d 120, 142 P.2d 423,
149 A.L.R. 1250 (1943) ; Lopes v. Capital Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 759, 13 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1961) ;
Olmstead v. West, supra; Crofoot v. Crofoot, 132 Cal. App. 2d 794, 283 P.2d 283 (1955).
See also 2 STANBURY, CALIFORNIA TRIAL AND. APPELLATE PRACTICE Appeal § 1173 (1958).
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Collins v. Corse1" illustrates the last mentioned principle. There was
an appeal from a discovery order issued by the superior court grant-
ing respondent the right to inspect certain books of account of the ap-
pellants and directing them to furnish him with other documents relative
to the case. From the order the appellants, defendants in the court below,
appealed. Oddly enough neither brief questioned the appealability of
the order, although one year earlier, in 'Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Recon-
struction Oil Co.," the Supreme Court of California had held that orders
relating to inspection and discovery were not appealable. The court
nevertheless considered the issue of appealability as one which had to
be dealt with. Citing Union Oil Co. as "direct authority for the con-
clusion" that such a discovery order was not appealable, the court dis-
missed the appeal on its own motion.
The California Rule
The one final judgment rule, "a fundamental principle of appellate
practice in the United States,"'" is found in statutory form in section
963 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides, in part: "An appeal
may be taken from a superior court . .. : 1. From a final judgment
entered in an action, or special proceeding, commenced in a superior
court, or brought into a superior court .... "" Other statutes make sim-
ilar provision concerning appeals from the inferior courts;14 however,
the discussion which follows will be limited chiefly to the rule as it
applies to appeals from the superior court under section 963.
The statutes also provide that certain types of interlocutory deter-
minations are subject to a direct appeal." However, the general rule
10 8 Cal. 2d 123, 64 P.2d 137 (1936).
114 Cal. 2d 541, 51 P.2d 81 (1935).
113 WrriKiN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Appeal § 10 (1954). See also 4 Am. Jun.
2d Appeal and Error § 50 (1962) ; 4 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 92 (1957).
1 0 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 963 (1) (emphasis added).
1, See CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §§ 972-82 (justice courts), 983-88j (municipal courts),
988t (new provisions relating to transfer of municipal and justice court appeals to the
district court of appeals).
" Eg., an appeal will lie under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 963(2) : "From an order grant-
ing a new trial or denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or granting
or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction, or appointing a re-
ceiver, or dissolving or refusing to dissolve an attachment, from any special order made after
final judgment, from any interlocutory judgment, order, or decree, hereafter made or entered
in actions to redeem real or personal property from a mortgage thereof, or a lien thereon,
determining such right to redeem and directing an accounting; and from such interlocutory
judgment in actions for partition as determines the rights and interests of the respective par-
ties and directs partition to be made, and interlocutory decrees of divorce."
,Aug., 1963]
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is that where such is not expressly authorized by statute an appeal lies
only from a final judgment.1"
The Rule--Origin and Theory
The modern rule that only final judgments are appealable, except
where modified by statute, can be traced to the common law decisions
involving the writs of error. 7
The precise factors which were originally responsible for the de-
velopment of the one final judgment rule are not altogether clear.'" They
go far back into the early history of the English common law.'9 Be
that as it may, the present-day reasons for the rule are "that piecemeal
disposition and multiple appeals in a single action would be oppressive
and costly, and that a review of intermediate rulings should await the
final disposition of the case." 20 Little imagination is required to visual-
ize the unbearable delay and ultimate chaos that would result if every
decision or ruling made by the trial court were immediately appeal-
able."'
Operation oj the Rule
Ideally, a discussion of the final judgment rule would begin with
a definition of the term "final judgment." The difficulty here is that
there is apparently no single definition that is completely satisfactory.22
It is only after an examination of the individual cases dealing with the
final judgment rule that the term begins to reveal its true colors.
" Bakewell v. Bakewell, 21 Cal. 2d 224, 130 P.2d 975 (1942) ; Maier Brewing Co. v.
Pacific Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 494, 15 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1961) ; Edlund v. Los
Altos Builders, 106 Cal. App. 2d 350, 235 P.2d 28 (1951).
"74 Am. JuR. 2d Appeal and Error § 50 (1962); Crick, The Final Judgment as a
Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932).
18 Crick, supra note 17.
19 Ibid.
203 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Appeal § 10 at 2151 (1954), quoted by the court
in: Maier Brewing Co. v. Pacific Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 494, 15 Cal. Rptr. 177
(1961) ; Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 185 Cal. App. 2d 149, 8 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1960); Brown v.
Memorial Nat'l Home Foundation, 158 Cal. App. 2d 448, 322 P.2d 600, 72 A.L.R. 2d 997
(1958). See also 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 48 (1962); 4 C.J.S. Appeal and
Error § 92 (1957).
"At this point it is important to remember that it is the procedure for appeal under
discussion and not the permissible scope of appellate review.
23 CAL. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 39 (1952). See also 3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PRO-
cE u E Judgment § 1 (various meanings of "final judgment"), § 2 (distinction between
"orders," "judgments," "decrees," etc.) (1954).
[Vol 15
The Judgment
It is clear that to meet the requirements of the final judgment rule
there must be a judgment.2" Thus, a verdict is not appealable.24 Like-
wise, an appeal will not lie from findings of fact, nor from findings
or conclusions of law, where there is no judgment.25 Moreover, a mem-
orandum or preliminary order authorizing a subsequent judgment is
not appealable, and an appeal therefrom will be dismissed. 6
The Code of Civil Procedure defines a judgment as "the final de-
termination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding."2 "
However, as will be seen shortly, the term "final judgment," as here
used, is not limited to the final judgment entered in an action which
finally determines all the issues presented by the pleadings.
In determining whether there has been a judgment, the question is
not one of form, but rather one of legal effect.2" The appellate court
will look behind any label used by the trial court. Thus, in Nevada
Constructors v. Mariposa Pub. Util. Dist. 9 the court dismissed an ap-
peal from an order denying the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment. Although the order appealed from was entitled a "judgment" on
its face, as evidenced by the records of the trial court, the appellate
court refused to be bound by the denomination. Upon examination of
the adjudication involved, the court concluded that it was in fact an
order, interlocutory in nature, and not a judgment within the meaning
of the final judgment rule. The appeal was therefore dismissed.
Finality
In addition to the requirement that there be a judgment, the judg-
ment must be a final judgment to be appealable.3" As on the issue
" 3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Appeal § 10 at 2152 (1954); "In applying the
final judgment rule it is necessary to make two basic distinctions: First, there must be a
judgment.... Second, ... the judgment must be inal...
" Lamoreux v. San Diego & Arizona E. Ry. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 617, 311 P.2d 1 (1957);
Sokolow v. City of Hope, 41 Cal. 2d 668, 262 P.2d 841 (1953) ; People v. Olds, 140 Cal. App.
2d 156, 294 P.2d 1034 (1956).
" Estate of Resler, 43 Cal. 2d 726, 278 P.2d 1 (1954) ; Estate of Murphy, 50 Cal. App.
2d 440, 123 P.2d 129 (1942) ; Ouzoonian v. Vaughan, 64 Cal. App. 369, 221 Pac. 958 (1923).
"' Preston v. Hearst, 54 Cal. 595 (1880) ; Fox v. Fox, 127 Cal. App. 2d 253, 273 P.2d
585 (1954).
"CAL. CODE CrV. Paoc. § 577.
"Nevada Constructors v. Mariposa Pub. Util. Dist., 114 Cal. App. 2d 816, 251 P.2d
53 (1952).
"Ibid.
Scarbery v. Bill Patch Land and Water Co., 170 Cal. App. 2d 368, 338 P.2d 916
(1959) ; George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 83 Cal. App. 2d 478, 189 P.2d 301 (1948).
COMMENTSAug., 1963]
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whether there has been a judgment, the question whether such judg-
ment is a final judgment within the meaning of the final judgment rule
turns not upon its denomination, but rather upon its effect."1  The
appellate court is required to look at the substance and legal effect, and
the presence of the words "interlocutory" or "final" is not necessarily
conclusive. 2
An often cited statement of the test of finality is found in Lyon v.
Goss, where the court said:
[W]here no issue is left for future consideration except the fact
of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that
decree is final, but where anything further in the nature of judicial
action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of
the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.
3 3
Thus, in Scarbery v. Bill Patch Land & Water Co. 4 an appeal was
dismissed when the court concluded that further judicial action was
necessary to finally determine the rights of the parties. Scarbery was
an action seeking declaratory relief, to quiet title and for a judgment
declaring that all rights of the defendants arising out of a "lease and
option to buy" had been terminated and cancelled by reason of their
failure to perform certain of the conditions and covenants. The trial
court concluded that the defendants were entitled to relief from their
default and should be allowed an opportunity to perform the agreement.
An interlocutory judgment and decree was entered in which it was
decreed, in part, that the defendants should deposit certain sums and
documents in escrow and that in the event of the failure of the defendants
to deposit such sums of money within a specified period a final judg-
ment should be entered, quieting plaintiffs' title and determining the
amount of restitution, if any, plaintiffs should make to the defendants,
and adjudicating the rights, duties and obligations of the parties in
relation to the agreement.
Pursuant to the judgment, the defendants deposited certain sums
and documents in escrow and gave notice thereof to the plaintiffs. To
the defendants' compliance with the terms of the judgment the plain-
1 Price v. Slawter, 169 Cal. App. 2d 448, 337 P.2d 914 (1959).
"In re Los Angeles County Pioneer Soc., 40 Cal. 2d 852, 257 P.2d 1 (1953) ; Taylor
v. Taylor, 153 Cal. App. 2d 144, 314 P.2d 60 (1957).
"3 19 Cal. 2d 659, 670, 123 P.2d 11, 17 (1942). See also In re Los Angeles County Pio-
neer Soc., 40 Cal. 2d 852, 257 P.2d 1 (1953) ; Scarbery v. Bin Patch Land and Water Co.,
170 Cal. App. 2d 368, 338 P.2d 916 (1959) ; Berry v. Berry, 140 Cal. App. 2d 50, 294 P.2d
757 (1956). See generally 2 STANBURY, CALIFORNIA TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTIcE Appeal
§ 873 (1958).
"170 Cal. App. 2d 368, 338 P.2d 916 (1959).
• [VOL is
tiffs filed objections which were overruled. The plaintiffs appealed
from the interlocutory judgment, an order modifying it and the order
overruling the objections to the defendants' purported compliance
with the judgment. The defendants then moved to dismiss the appeal,
claiming that the interlocutory judgment and decree appealed from
was not an appealable judgment. The motion was granted and the
appeal was dismissed.
The appellate court noted that the fact the judgment was entitled
"Interlocutory Judgment and Decree" by the trial court was not neces-
sarily conclusive. However, the court further observed that there
had not been a final judgment, saying:
Further judicial action on the part of the court is necessary to
finally determine the rights of the parties in view of the question
which has arisen as to the compliance by the parties with the terms
of the agreement and the decree, and the trial court's specific decree
that a final judgment be entered determining the ultimate rights of the
parties under the agreement involved. 35
Conversely, in Kneeland v. Ethicon Suture Laboratories6 the court
held an order quashing service of summons on a foreign corporation
appealable on the ground that it met the test of the Lyon case, set forth
above.
Erickson v. Boothe3 was an action for declaratory relief, to deter-
mine whether the defendant had effectively exercised an option to "re-
lease" certain real property under the terms of a lease contract. A
judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on appeal without direction.as
The plaintiff thereafter filed a dismissal, and the defendant, who had
also sought declaratory relief, moved for judgment in accordance
with the dismissal on appeal. Ultimately, the trial court set aside the
dismissal and entered judgment declaring that the defendant had
effectively exercised the option and was entitled to be restored to posses-
sion, and declaring that the defendant was entitled to an accounting of
the rents, issues and profits taken by the plaintiff while in possession. It
further provided that unless the parties were able to agree on the
accounting, and unless the plaintiff paid such by certain specified dates,
the defendant could elect to proceed in the action to recover such rents,
issues and profits. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed. The
"' Id. at 372, 338 P.2d at 919.
" 113 Cal. App. 2d 335, 248 P.2d 447 (1952).
"'35 Cal. 2d 108, 216 P.2d 454 (1950).8Erickson v. Boothe, 79 Cal. App. 2d 266, 179 P.2d 611 (1947).
COMMENTSAug., 1963]
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Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, saying, "It is manifest that the
judgment is merely interlocutory and was so intended because the
court contemplated that further judicial proceedings would be necessary
in this action before there would be a final adjudication of the matter.
An appeal does not lie from such a judgment." 9
An appeal will lie, however, where the conditions of the order are
such as to be "self-executing." Thus, in Yarbrough v. Yarbrough" an
appeal was allowed from an order vacating a default judgment, con-
ditional upon the payment of costs by defendant, upon the grounds
that the order was self-executing. Since no further judicial action was
necessary, the determination was final for purposes of appeal.
Frequently the courts have stated that "there can be but one final
judgment in an action," and that such a judgment is "one which in
effect ends the suit in the court in which it is entered, and finally deter-
mines the rights of the parties in relation to the matter in controversy."
4
l
However, the Supreme Court of California has declared that such
cases are applicable only where the interests of the parties are identi-
cal.42 Where there has been a joinder of parties and causes there may
be several separate interests in a single trial. In such cases separate
judgments may be entered at different times, and "it is well settled that
where parties have distinct interests there can be a separate, final and
appealable judgment for each."
43
Final Determination of A Collateral Matter
44
For purposes of appeal, a final judgment is not necessarily the
last one in an action and the term "final judgment" is not limited to a
decree finally determining all issues presented by the pleadings.
As already mentioned, certain interlocutory orders are made ap-
pealable by statute.45 Such orders are, of course, exceptions to the final
judgment rule. In addition, the California courts have permitted an
appeal where there has been a "final determination of some collateral
" Erickson v. Boothe, 35 Cal. 2d 108, 109, 216 P.2d 454, 455 (1950).
40 144 Cal. App. 2d 610, 301 P.2d 426 (1956).
4' Bank of America v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 697, 701, 128 P.2d 357, 360 (1942);
David v. Goodman, 89 Cal. App. 2d 162, 165, 200 P.2d 568, 570 (1948).
42 Howe v. Key System Transit Co., 198 Cal. 525, 246 Pac. 39 (1926). See generally
3 CAL. JuR. 2d Appeal and Error § 40 (1952).
4 3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Appeal § 12 at 2153-54 (1954). See also 3 WITKIN,
supra, §§ 13-14; 3 CAL. Jt. 2d Appeal and Error § 40 (1952).
" For a more thorough treatment of the collateral order doctrine, see Comment, 15
HASTINGS L.J. 105 (this issue).
" See, e.g., Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 963 (2), set out in its entirety in note 15 supra.
[VoL 15
matter distinct and severable from the general subject of the litiga-
tion."7
4 6
Generally spoken of as an "exception" to the rule of one final judg-
ment, such a determination is regarded as "substantially the same as
a final judgment in an independent proceeding,"47and upon that
ground an appeal will be allowed.
It is under this so-called "exception" to the final judgment rule
that an appeal may lie from an order which is not among those expressly
designated by the statutes as appealable, even though there has been
no final decree in the suit.
48
However, to be appealable under this doctrine there appears to be
an additional requirement beyond those of finality and collaterality
mentioned above; namely, the order must direct the payment of money
by appellant or the performance of an act by or against him.49
Role of the Extraordinary Writs
Certain determinations fail to fulfill the requirements of the final
judgment rule. A typical example is the ordinary discovery order.
Such an order generally cannot be regarded as a final determination
of a collateral matter, since it is in the nature of a proceeding to
compel evidence to prove or disprove the truth of the issues involved
in the case.5" Since they are likewise not among those interlocutory
orders expressly made appealable by the statutes, orders relating to
inspection and discovery are not directly appealable.51
Suppose, however, the trial court issues a discovery order compel-
ling the disclosure of information which is subject to the claim of
privilege. Or, conversely, suppose the court issues an order denying
a motion for discovery to which the moving party was entitled. Ob-
viously, to require the party adversely affected by the order to await
a final judgment before seeking a remedy might very well subject him
6 3 W ITKIN, CALIFORNIA PRocEDuRE Appeal § 11 at 2152 (1954).
7 Ibid.
"Howe v. Key System Transit Co., 198 Cal. 525, 246 Pac. 39 (1926); Kneeland v.
Ethicon Suture Laboratories, 113 Cal. App. 2d 335, 248 P.2d 447 (1952). See also 2
STANRURY, CALIFORNIA TIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE Appeal § 875 (1958), wherein can
be found a list of decisions illustrative of those in which independent appeals have been
permitted from orders on collateral issues.
"Sjoberg v. Hastorf, 33 Cal. 2d 116, 199 P.2d 668 (1948).
60 See Collins v. Corse, 8 Cal. 2d 123, 64 P.2d 137 (1936).
6 1 Ibid.; Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 4 Cal. 2d 541, 51 P.2d 81
(1935).
COMMENTSAug., 1963]
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to unfair hardship or irreparable harm. Under these circumstances,
the remedy available by way of appeal is wholly inadequate. How
then is justice to be done?
The California cases are numerous in which the court has recog-
nized the nonappealability of such orders, and yet afforded a remedy
under one of the extraordinary writs, such as prohibition52 or manda-
mus. 3 Since there is no "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the
ordinary course of law," the statutory requirements for issuance of
the writs have been satisfied.5"
Illustrative in this regard is Dowell v. Superior Court," an action
for damages for personal injuries, where petitioner sought a writ of
mandamus to compel the trial court to set aside its order denying an
application for inspection of a written statement which petitioner had
given to defendant's claims investigator. The court concluded that
petitioner had a right to inspect the statement in question and issued
the writ. In so doing, the court noted that the order was not appealable
and that mandamus was the proper remedy.
Finally, it should be noted that some determinations which fulfill
all the requirements of a final judgment are not appealable.56 For ex-
ample section 1222 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "The
judgment and orders of the court or judge, made in cases of contempt,
are final and conclusive." Thus, no appeal lies from such judgments
and orders."' Here again, the only way a review may be had is by
resort to use of one of the extraordinary writs.5"
"Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954). (On the question of
what constitutes privileged matter, certain points in Holm were overruled in Suezaki v.
Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 166, 373 P.2d 432 (1962). However, the principle for which the
case is here cited was in no way affected by that decision.) ; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior
Court, 36 Cal. 2d 538, 225 P.2d 905 (1950). See also Comment, Use of Prohibition to Avoid
the Final Judgment Limitation on Appeal, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 124 (1953).
"Dowell v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 483, 304 P.2d 1009 (1956) ; Pettie v. Superior
Court, 178 Cal. App. 2d 680, 3 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1960).
"See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1086 (mandamus), § 1103 (prohibition).
"47 Cal. 2d 483, 304 P.2d 1009 (1956).
"Listed and discussed in 3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Appeal § 18 (1954).
"John Breuner Co. v. Bryant, 36 Cal. 2d 877, 229 P.2d 356 (1951). See also 2
STANBURY, CALIFORNIA TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE Appeal § 891 (1958).
" Wilson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 2d 458, 189 P.2d 266 (1948); In re Chapman,
141 Cal. App. 2d 387, 389, 295 P.2d 573, 575 (1956), where the court quoted In re Lake,
65 Cal. App. 420, 423, 224 Pac. 126, 127 (1924): "[S]ection 1222 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, declares that the judgment in cases of contempt is final and conclusive. Thus,
one who has been adjudged guilty of contempt has but two remedies-habeas corpus and
certiorari." The rule of nonappealability is equally applicable where the alleged contemner




Under the one final judgment rule in California an appeal lies only
from a final judgment, unless the determination is: (1) subject to an
immediate appeal by express statutory provision, or (2) such that it
constitutes a final determination of a collateral matter. In a few cases
there is no appeal even though there has been a determination that
amounts to a final judgment.
An appellate court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a
nonappealable order. Moreover, jurisdiction cannot be conferred by
waiver or estoppel, and even where the parties consent or are silent
upon the issue of appealability an appellate court is required to dis-
miss the appeal on its own motion.
Thus, in cases where a party cannot afford to await a final judgment
he must seek a remedy other than by way of appeal. Since there is no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law resort
may be had to one of the extraordinary writs, which is in fact the
general practice in such cases.
As the procedure for appeal is regulated by statute, little change
in the existing rule is foreseeable unless by action of the legislature.
It has been said that the courts cannot, or at least should not, through
the guise of interpretation make an order appealable that the legisla-
ture intended should not be appealable. 9 Of course, with the exception
of those cases where the statutes provide that the determination is
"final and conclusive," 6 and thus not appealable, legislative intent
is by negative implication only.
Whether there is a need for change is arguable to say the least.
Certainly a major consideration should be the adequacy of the remedies
available under the present system. In those cases where there is no
right to an immediate appeal, is the relief afforded by the extraordinary
writs sufficient? Any first-year law student is familiar with the state-
ment that the issuance of a writ is a matter of discretion with the court.
It might be argued that therefore the court could arbitrarily refuse to
issue the writ, even where the party had no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The conclusion, how-
ever, would be erroneous. In an early California case the court said,
concerning mandamus:
" Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 185 Cal App. 2d 149, 157, 8 Cal. Rptr. 107, 112 (1960);
Peninsula Properties Co. v. Santa Cruz, 106 Cal. App. 2d 669, 677, 235 P.2d 635, 639 (1951).
" See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1222.
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[W]here one has a substantial right to protect or enforce, and
this may be accomplished by such a writ, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, he is en-
titled as a matter of right to the writ, or more correctly, in other words,
it would be an abuse of discretion to refuse it.'
However, Witkin suggests that a great deal "can be done to avoid in-
justice, and to decrease use of extraordinary writs, by adding to the
statutory enumeration those judgments and orders which obviously
should be reviewable.
' 62
In some states an exception to the final judgment rule is recognized
where a decree which is in a strict sense interlocutory should be re-
viewed immediately because of possible injurious consequences. 3
Similarly, in some jurisdictions an appeal may be prosecuted from an
order, judgment or decree even though it is intermediate or interlocu-
tory where it affects a substantial right. 4
In the federal courts an appeal is allowed at the discretion of the
appellate court where the trial judge certifies that the "order involves
a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litiga-
tion .... -""
While the objectives of the one final judgment rule appear sound,
there is certainly some question whether they have been fulfilled. The
bulk of cases concerning what is or is not a "final judgment," or
what determinations do or do not meet the requirements of the rule,
is rather convincing evidence that it has afforded a breeding ground
for the very evil it is designed to prevent. It is therefore suggested that
a need for further study into the possibilities of additional statutory
modification, or at least clarification, is indicated.
"l Potomac Oil Co. v. Dye, 10 Cal. App. 534, 537, 102 Pac. 677, 679 (1909) (emphasis
added). For a similar statement concerning prohibition see Havemeyer v. Superior Court,
84 Cal. 327, 401, 24 Pac. 121, 140 (1890).
023 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Appeal § 9 at 2151 (1954).
"Montaquila v. Montaquila, 85 R.I. 447, 133 A.2d 119 (1957).
"'See 4 Am,. Jui. 2d Appeal and Error § 62 (1962); C.J.S. Appeal and Error §
100 (1957).
or 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b) (1958).
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